While performing an audit of MySQL e-matters found several problems:
- signed/unsigned problem in COM_TABLE_DUMP
-
Two sizes were taken as signed integers from a request and then cast
to unsigned integers without checking for negative numbers. Since the
resulting numbers where used for a memcpy() operation this could lead
to memory corruption.
- Password length handling in COM_CHANGE_USER
-
When re-authenticating to a different user MySQL did not perform
all checks that are performed on initial authentication. This created
two problems:
- it allowed for single-character password brute forcing (as was fixed in
February 2000 for initial login) which could be used by a normal user to
gain root privileges to the database
- it was possible to overflow the password buffer and force the server
to execute arbitrary code
- read_rows() overflow in libmysqlclient
-
When processing the rows returned by a SQL server there was no check
for overly large rows or terminating NUL characters. This can be used
to exploit SQL clients if they connect to a compromised MySQL server.
- read_one_row() overflow in libmysqlclient
-
When processing a row as returned by a SQL server the returned field
sizes were not verified. This can be used to exploit SQL clients if they
connect to a compromised MySQL server.
For Debian GNU/Linux 3.0/woody this has been fixed in version 3.23.49-8.2
and version 3.22.32-6.3 for Debian GNU/Linux 2.2/potato.
We recommend that you upgrade your mysql packages as soon as possible.
